The EU’s necessary choices and Eurobonds for security, technology and the environment
The outgoing EU Commission presided over a dramatic season of crisis, from the Covid-19 pandemic to Russian aggression in Ukraine, the war in the Middle East and the energy crisis. A new season now begins for the new Commission, hopefully one of new beginnings, recovery and investment. One clear element of continuity remains, the leadership of President Ursula von der Leyen. But the outlook is radically altered, a crossroads between revival and decline. Either Europe will be able to grow as a political and industrial player and so define far-sighted and ambitious sustainable development choices, to meet the challenges from the two main players on the geopolitical scene, the US and China, and the manoeuvres of other major international players, India and Russia, the Arab countries and all the other parties in a restless Global South, or it will have to reckon with unsettling deterioration in its role, weight and, ultimately, well-being. It would basically become an elegant, cultured, sophisticated but irrelevant Grand Hotel where the world’s rich and powerful go to take their holiday (a warning that arrived in recent weeks from the Financial Times).
“Europe is losing competitiveness and only Italy is holding its own against the United States and China,” according to Marco Fortis in IlSole24Ore (27 June), analysing export trends between 2016 and 2023.
In the immediate aftermath of the elections for the new EU Parliament and voting for the new Commission (supported by People’s Party, Socialists, Liberals and Greens), there was much discussion around alliances, political agreements, consensus and dissent (Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s vote, as leader of Brothers of Italy, against von der Leyen caused quite a stir). But it may well now be necessary that, political forces aside, the Commission, Parliament and Council of Europe rapidly indicate the choices to be made concerning the crucial issues in the new season and find the financial resources to deploy.
The themes of the commitments to be made are clear: a common security policy, accounting for the EU position on defence (within NATO, but with a more robust role for Brussels and the EU countries, to offset a potential lowering of US commitment), on energy autonomy, and on cybersecurity-related technologies; an industrial policy that closes the growing gap in competitiveness with respect to the US and China, with a European strategy for Artificial Intelligence and with a new Green Deal that doesn’t disadvantage companies in European countries and contains measures to mitigate the cost impact; fiscal and social policies that avoid distortions to competition by dumping between individuals or EU countries and reform welfare; and a financial policy that makes Europe a single, efficient, open and competitive banking market, capable of attracting international investment and providing opportunities for allocating the savings of European households and companies.
These choices are challenging, but vital. They demand huge resources, both for security and to finance the twin transition, environmental and digital: at least one trillion a year for the next decade. They must be found by increasing the EU budget, expanding to 2% of GDP, also to create “European public goods”. They should also be requested from the international markets, following the excellent decision already made for the Next Generation EU Recovery Plan, raising market funds, as common EU debt, or to cope with the consequences of the pandemic.
In other words, the time has finally come for a strategy already devised by one of Europe’s sharpest and most statesmanlike minds, Jacques Delors: Eurobonds.
But there is also an essential governance reform to be carried out rapidly, while being clearly aware of the difficulties to be overcome: to move beyond the unanimity requirement for decision-making (putting an end to the power of individual countries to veto agreements of which all other countries approve) and therefore proceed with qualified majorities or agreements, on various topics, between countries ready to move forward. Defining the institutional rules is complex, maintaining the values of governability together with those of equally weighted representation. But these are certainly issues that have to move into the pipeline, soon and effectively.
Essential indications in this area are contained in the report prepared by the working group on the single market led by Enrico Letta (“Europe is much more than a market”, maintains the president of the Delors Institute) and in the one on competition led by Mario Draghi, expected in the autumn. No protectionism, which is especially harmful for an economic area with strong callings to exports, like Europe. A strong decision instead needs to be taken on open markets, competitiveness, innovation and quality of development.
An ‘Open Letter to the European Institutions’ sent in mid-July contains interesting considerations on precisely these issues, sent to Ursula von der Leyen, Roberta Metsola and Charles Michel by six authoritative Study Centres, the Centre for European Reform (London-Brussels-Berlin), Fondazione Astrid (Rome), Fondazione Res Publica (Milan), Fundaciòn Alternativas (Madrid), Les Gracques and Terra Nova (both Paris).
It starts by reflecting on the “structural vulnerability” of the EU and its countries, owing to the dependence of the economy on the markets of other countries, imports (energy and strategic raw materials) and exports, and therefore the decisive influence of geopolitical crises. So too does it consider moving away from the “technological frontiers” of the US and China but, looking closely at the evolution of the various “knowledge economies”, also of India. It also reflects on an “adverse long-term demographic trend”, “disappointing productivity dynamics” and a “high and widespread public debt that reduces the space for expansionary fiscal policies in many countries”.
These are strong constraints, which the US and China do not suffer from, and overcoming them requires political choices like the ones discussed.
There is a challenging political transition: “The EU and its member states should take a clear stance to make it clear that they do not intend to endorse climate denial, defensive mercantilism, demographic autarky or withdrawal from international value chains, which – for Europe – would be a self-defeating decision.” These are all short-lived strategies that “would condemn the EU to turn in on itself and condemn it to further fragmentation and irrelevance.”
The conclusion of the document from the six Study Centres is very clear: “A new world order is emerging. If it remains half-built, the EU will have no role in shaping it. The US and China are economic and political areas; the EU has not yet become one. A third major global player would make the international system more stable.”
The EU should therefore strive to “revive multilateralism, avoiding the pure logic of power in international relations that is bound to worsen the situation for all involved” and the European Council and Parliament must “recognise this crucial point and act accordingly. They have the opportunity to give a clear signal in this area and act accordingly.” Strengthening Europe, despite everything, and playing a leading role in the new world balance.
(photo Getty Images)
The outgoing EU Commission presided over a dramatic season of crisis, from the Covid-19 pandemic to Russian aggression in Ukraine, the war in the Middle East and the energy crisis. A new season now begins for the new Commission, hopefully one of new beginnings, recovery and investment. One clear element of continuity remains, the leadership of President Ursula von der Leyen. But the outlook is radically altered, a crossroads between revival and decline. Either Europe will be able to grow as a political and industrial player and so define far-sighted and ambitious sustainable development choices, to meet the challenges from the two main players on the geopolitical scene, the US and China, and the manoeuvres of other major international players, India and Russia, the Arab countries and all the other parties in a restless Global South, or it will have to reckon with unsettling deterioration in its role, weight and, ultimately, well-being. It would basically become an elegant, cultured, sophisticated but irrelevant Grand Hotel where the world’s rich and powerful go to take their holiday (a warning that arrived in recent weeks from the Financial Times).
“Europe is losing competitiveness and only Italy is holding its own against the United States and China,” according to Marco Fortis in IlSole24Ore (27 June), analysing export trends between 2016 and 2023.
In the immediate aftermath of the elections for the new EU Parliament and voting for the new Commission (supported by People’s Party, Socialists, Liberals and Greens), there was much discussion around alliances, political agreements, consensus and dissent (Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s vote, as leader of Brothers of Italy, against von der Leyen caused quite a stir). But it may well now be necessary that, political forces aside, the Commission, Parliament and Council of Europe rapidly indicate the choices to be made concerning the crucial issues in the new season and find the financial resources to deploy.
The themes of the commitments to be made are clear: a common security policy, accounting for the EU position on defence (within NATO, but with a more robust role for Brussels and the EU countries, to offset a potential lowering of US commitment), on energy autonomy, and on cybersecurity-related technologies; an industrial policy that closes the growing gap in competitiveness with respect to the US and China, with a European strategy for Artificial Intelligence and with a new Green Deal that doesn’t disadvantage companies in European countries and contains measures to mitigate the cost impact; fiscal and social policies that avoid distortions to competition by dumping between individuals or EU countries and reform welfare; and a financial policy that makes Europe a single, efficient, open and competitive banking market, capable of attracting international investment and providing opportunities for allocating the savings of European households and companies.
These choices are challenging, but vital. They demand huge resources, both for security and to finance the twin transition, environmental and digital: at least one trillion a year for the next decade. They must be found by increasing the EU budget, expanding to 2% of GDP, also to create “European public goods”. They should also be requested from the international markets, following the excellent decision already made for the Next Generation EU Recovery Plan, raising market funds, as common EU debt, or to cope with the consequences of the pandemic.
In other words, the time has finally come for a strategy already devised by one of Europe’s sharpest and most statesmanlike minds, Jacques Delors: Eurobonds.
But there is also an essential governance reform to be carried out rapidly, while being clearly aware of the difficulties to be overcome: to move beyond the unanimity requirement for decision-making (putting an end to the power of individual countries to veto agreements of which all other countries approve) and therefore proceed with qualified majorities or agreements, on various topics, between countries ready to move forward. Defining the institutional rules is complex, maintaining the values of governability together with those of equally weighted representation. But these are certainly issues that have to move into the pipeline, soon and effectively.
Essential indications in this area are contained in the report prepared by the working group on the single market led by Enrico Letta (“Europe is much more than a market”, maintains the president of the Delors Institute) and in the one on competition led by Mario Draghi, expected in the autumn. No protectionism, which is especially harmful for an economic area with strong callings to exports, like Europe. A strong decision instead needs to be taken on open markets, competitiveness, innovation and quality of development.
An ‘Open Letter to the European Institutions’ sent in mid-July contains interesting considerations on precisely these issues, sent to Ursula von der Leyen, Roberta Metsola and Charles Michel by six authoritative Study Centres, the Centre for European Reform (London-Brussels-Berlin), Fondazione Astrid (Rome), Fondazione Res Publica (Milan), Fundaciòn Alternativas (Madrid), Les Gracques and Terra Nova (both Paris).
It starts by reflecting on the “structural vulnerability” of the EU and its countries, owing to the dependence of the economy on the markets of other countries, imports (energy and strategic raw materials) and exports, and therefore the decisive influence of geopolitical crises. So too does it consider moving away from the “technological frontiers” of the US and China but, looking closely at the evolution of the various “knowledge economies”, also of India. It also reflects on an “adverse long-term demographic trend”, “disappointing productivity dynamics” and a “high and widespread public debt that reduces the space for expansionary fiscal policies in many countries”.
These are strong constraints, which the US and China do not suffer from, and overcoming them requires political choices like the ones discussed.
There is a challenging political transition: “The EU and its member states should take a clear stance to make it clear that they do not intend to endorse climate denial, defensive mercantilism, demographic autarky or withdrawal from international value chains, which – for Europe – would be a self-defeating decision.” These are all short-lived strategies that “would condemn the EU to turn in on itself and condemn it to further fragmentation and irrelevance.”
The conclusion of the document from the six Study Centres is very clear: “A new world order is emerging. If it remains half-built, the EU will have no role in shaping it. The US and China are economic and political areas; the EU has not yet become one. A third major global player would make the international system more stable.”
The EU should therefore strive to “revive multilateralism, avoiding the pure logic of power in international relations that is bound to worsen the situation for all involved” and the European Council and Parliament must “recognise this crucial point and act accordingly. They have the opportunity to give a clear signal in this area and act accordingly.” Strengthening Europe, despite everything, and playing a leading role in the new world balance.
(photo Getty Images)